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for Race Horse Drugging
By RAY H. GARRISON* AND JEWEL N. KLEIN**
INTRODUCTION * * *
The sport of horse racing, which yields more than $608
million in state revenue annually,' is confronting substantial in-
tegrity issues. 2 The most serious integrity problem involves those
few who attempt to alter the outcome of a race through the
abuse of permitted medications and the use of illegal drugs.
The drugging of race horses has received enormous attention
within the racing industry itself and from the public at large.
Bills to impose federal controls over both the medication of horses
and post-race testing are presently being considered by the U.S.
Congress.3 State racing officials, however, maintain that they
have the ability under appropriate rules and comprehensive test-
ing programs to control drugging.4
The various state racing commissions have adopted some
form of trainer responsibility rule in an effort to prevent drug-
ging. One form is the absolute insurer rule which, in its more
pristine form, provides:
" Member, Illinois Racing Board; Senior Counsel, International Harvester Com-
pany. B.A. 1942, Western Kentucky University; M.A. 1944, University of Kentucky; J.D.
1949, University of Chicago.
.. General Counsel, Illinois Racing Board. B.A. 1963, Brandeis University; J.D.
1966, University of Chicago.
. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect
the views of the Illinois Racing Board.
1 THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE RACING COMMISSIONERS' [hereinafter cited
as NASRC] 1981 REPORT, PARI-MUTUEL RACING: STATISTICAL SUMMARY.
2 See Acceptance Speech of Charles E. Schmidt, Jr., as newly-elected President of
the NASRC, reprinted in 48 NASRC BULL. 17:J (April 29, 1982); see also THOROUGHBRED
RACING PROTECTIVE BUREAU. 1980 ANNUAL REPORT; Berube, Lack of Uniformity Among
States, 1982 THE BLOOD-HORSE 3057.
3 S. 1043, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981) H.R. 2331, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
4 Testimony of Dr. Joseph C. O'Dea, First Vice-President NASRC, on S. 1043, re-
printed in 48 NASRC BULL. 21:1 (May27, 1982).
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The trainer shall be the absolute insurer of, and be responsible
for, the condition of horses entered by him in a race regardless
of the acts of third parties. Should the chemical or other anal-
ysis of saliva, or urine samples, or other tests, prove positive,
showing the presence of any narcotic, stimulant, chemical, or
drug of any kind or description, the trainer of the horse may be
suspended or ruled off.
The absolute insurer rule reflects two contradictory notions.
First, the words "absolute" and "insurer" suggest notions of li-
ability without fault. On the other hand, the concept of trainer
responsibility suggests traditional tort principles of culpability
and exercise of due care.
In 1969, the Illinois Supreme Court in Brennan v. Illinois
Racing Boards held that the absolute insurer rule was an uncon-
stitutional deprivation of due process of law. The decision in
Brennan has been rejected by various courts and followed by
none.6 However, the current trend among racing states is toward
adoption of trainer responsibility rules that require trainers to
guard their horses against drugging.
This Article will examine the public policies that have
prompted racing commissions to adopt trainer responsibility
rules based upon either absolute liability or fault. The decision in
the Brennan case will then be reviewed in light of the divergent
lines of authorities that are embodied in its majority and minor-
ity opinions. In conclusion, an analysis and evaluation will be
made of the issue of whether state racing commissions can curb
drug violations in the absence of an absolute insurer rule.
I. DRUGGING-WHO DOES IT?
There are, of course, numerous ways to affect the outcome of
a horse race which do not involve the use of drugs.7 Drugging,
5 247N.E. 2d881 (Ill. 1969).
6 See Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering v. Caple, 362 So. 2d 1350 (Fla. 1978) (up-
holding suspension for possession of needles, syringes and vitamins in unlocked cabinet);
Jamison v. State Racing Comm'n, 507 P.2d 426 (N.M. 1973) (chemical analyses showing
ritalin in sample); O'Daniel v. Ohio State Racing Comm'n, 307 N.E.2d 529 (Ohio 1974)
(post-race samples contained oxyphenbutazone).
7 The Commission on the Review of the National Policy Toward Gambling identi-
fied the following general methods of race fixing: bribery, use of "ringers" (substitution of
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however, strikes at the heart of racing-the public's perception
of its fairness and legitimacy. The horse that competes under the
influence of a drug has a hidden advantage not available to the
other horses. Likewise, a drugged horse is dangerous to other
horses and riders.8 The four types of race horse drugging are:
drugging to win, drugging to lose, therapeutic doping and inad-
vertent or accidental doping.9
Drugging to win involves the use of stimulants to improve a
horse's speed or performance. It also may involve the use of
powerful pain killers to permit a sore or lame horse to race faster
than it would have been able to race had it felt the pain. 10 Drug-
ging to win also may involve minute quantities of tranquilizers
used to calm a fractious horse in the starting gate so as to permit
the horse to start the race more competitively. Drugging to win is
usually an "inside job" by the trainer or by someone in the
trainer's immediate employment."
Drugging to lose, which is a more pernicious problem to reg-
ulate, involves the use of tranquilizers, depressants or other drugs
to slow the horse's speed. Such druggings often involve more than
one horse in the race as the economic investment in fixing a race
is safer and surer when the gambler-fixer knows which horses
will lose and can then bet alternate choices to win.'2 Drugging to
lose is usually considered an "outside job."'1
faster horse for slower one of similar appearance) and use of prohibited drugs. The Com-
mission, created by Congress in the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, published its
final report, GAMBLING IN AMERICA, in 1976.
8 See 127 CONG. REc. E878 (March 21, 1981) (remarks of Congressman Bruce F.
Vento, D. Minn.) See also Simmons v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 407 So. 2d 269,
271 n.5 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (quotes findings of Florida legislature).
9 Clarke, Dope and Doping, MED. SCl. & L. 218 (Oct. 1969).
10 Tassistro v. Louisiana State Racing Comm'n, 269 So. 2d 834, 838 (La. App.
1972), cert. denied, 271 So. 2d 874 (La. 1973). See also Commonwealth v. Webb, 274
A.2d 261 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1971), appeal dismissed, 284 A.2d 499 (Pa. 1971) ("It is naive
to say that an analgesic such as Butazolidin does not affect the speed of a horse which has a
sore ankle").
1 Only the trainer is in a position to discover the correct dose for a particular horse
and to administer it at the right time.
12 Report by John Dailey to the New York Racing and Wagering Board, Analysis of
Gimmick Betting (Jan. 22, 1980).
13 Trainers retain clients by winning races for them. Trainers generally receive 10%
of a winning purse, in addition to the daily training fee. Thus, trainers have an economic
incentive to win, and they have much easier and less risky ways to lose. A bucket of cold
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Therapeutic drugs may be of two kinds: first, those which
may be administered to a horse entered to race under the rules of
a particular racing commission; second, those which are not per-
mitted but are generally recognized by equine practitioners as
being useful. As beneficial as the latter may be, the presence of
these drugs in a post-race sample is often prohibited. 14
Examples of inadvertent drugging include the story of the
horse that ate a candy bar out of a patron's hand and tested pos-
itive for theophylline, a prohibited drug.'5 More recently, a leg
paint whose label did not disclose the presence of benzocaine 'was
administered. The post-race urine sample contained this drug.
Further investigation disclosed that the product used did contain
benzocaine,6 possibly the result of airborne contamination at the
manufacturing plant.
Prohibited drugs are usually administered in three ways: (1)
as a result of carelessness or accident; (2) by disgruntled former
employees1' and jealous competitors, or (3) by Martians in the
middle of the night. Review of the cases discloses no other source
water or a word to the jockey may accomplish a loss without the risk of post-race testing.
In harness racing where trainer and driver are often the same person, a loss can be accom-
plished in the race through skillful failure to urge the horse to win.
Racing commissions have trouble dealing with fixing to lose because generally it is
the winners, not the losers, of horse races that are routinely tested. No racing commission
in the country, whether funded directly by the legislature as in Illinois, Florida and Cali-
fornia, or funded indirectly by the race tracks, as in New York, has a sufficient budget for
post-race testing of every horse in every race. See Jacobs v. Kentucky State Racing
Comm'n, 562 S.W.2d 641 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977) ("The testing of all winners of races with-
out testing other horses.., is a legitimate classification based on long standing custom
and practices in the racing industry").
While pre-race testing does involve all horses in a race, not all drugs can be de-
tected in pre-race blood samples. VETERINARY-CHEMIST ADvISoRY COMMITTEE, AN EVAL-
UATION OF PRE- AND POST-RACE TESTING AND BLOOD AND URINE DRUG TESTING IN HORSES
(Report submitted to the NASRC Mar. 16, 1978).
14 11 ILL. ADMIN. Bc. 509.40.
15 In Illinois, when the rules permitted the pre-race administration of aspirin, a
trainer administered a popular, over-the-counter medicine containing aspirin but he did
not read the label. The product also contained caffeine-a prohibited stimulant.
16 Stewards' Ruling # 42, Maywood Park Race Track, Dec. 14,1981.
17 See State ex rel Paoli v. Baldwin, 31 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 1947) (groom had placed bets
on the day the drugged horse raced, cashed tickets immediately after the race, and quit
without notice when trainer suspended); Brennan v. Illinois Racing Bd., 247 N.E.2d at
881 (fired employee seen near drugged horse on day before the race); Maryland Racing
Comm'n v. McGee, 128 A.2d 419 (Md. 1957) (fired employee had threatened to make
trouble for McGee and was working in same barn as drugged horse).
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of illicit drugs. Martians constitute the largest category because
in most cases trainers do not know how the drug was admins-
tered or who administered the drug, but they are certain they did
not. The reasons for the trainers' alleged ignorance are many, not
the least of which are that administering drugs to race horses is a
crime in many states'8 and that administrative proceedings often
result in severe penalties. 19
II. THE TRAINERS-WHo THEY ARE AND WHAT THEY Do
To understand the drugging cases, it will be helpful to first
review the trainer's role in the racing industry and then examine
briefly how a typical drugging case comes to the attention of the
racing commission.
The barn area, also known as the "backstretch" of a race
track, houses hundreds of horses and horse-care workers. At most
race tracks, the barn area swarms with people early in the morn-
ing. Where racing occurs in the afternoon, training hours are
from 6:00 to 10:00 a.m. Horses are fed at an earlier hour,
brought to the track for exercise, walked until they have cooled
down, bathed, brushed and returned to their stalls.
As the overseers of the training process, trainers move from
the barn to the track and back again, watching horses work out,
clocking their times, instructing grooms, conferring with the vet-
erinarian2o and ordering feed. Exercise riders or drivers are used
to exercise horses. Grooms move from stall to stall, cleaning,
18 Administering drugs to race horses is a crime in the following states: Delaware,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 28, § 705 (1974); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 550.24(2) (West 1972 &
Supp. 1982); Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 8, § 37-36 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982); Louisiana,
LA. 11Ev. STAT. ANN. § 4:175 (West 1973); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, §§ 280, 332
(1964); Massachusetts, MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 128A, § 13B (Michie/Law, Co-op. 1981);
New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:5-71 (West 1973); Pennsylvania, PENN. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
S 7102 (Purdon 1973). Drugging is neither a felony nor a misdemeanor in Arizona, Arkan-
sas, California, Colorado, Idaho, Kentucky, New York, Ohio, West Virginia and Wyo-
ming.
19 See, e.g., Solimena v. State, 402 So. 2d 1240, 1243 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (up-
holding both suspension of trainer's license for four years and six months and $5,000 fine
against trainer because Sublimaze was found in six post-race urine samples).
20 The veterinarians move from barn to barn examining horses, taking blood
samples, using portable X-ray equipment, performing minor surgery, worming, prescrib-
ing and injecting medication, dispensing advice and soliciting new clients.
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scrubbing, massaging or bandaging tender legs. Where mechan-
ical walkers are not used, hotwalkers slowly walk the horse
around the inside of the barn. Owners occasionally stop by the
barn to offer a carrot or confer with the trainer.
In the midst of the hectic activity, trainers must study the
"condition book" or the "overnight'21 and then enter the horse in
the race which they believe the horse is most able to win based
upon its age, sex, race record and general skill. The entry is made
by completing the appropriate forms in the racing secretary's of-
fice.2
Aside from their duty to prevent a horse from being drugged,
trainers have numerous other responsibilities prescribed by the
rules of various racing commissions. When trainers enter a horse
in a race, they must be present in the paddock and supervise the
saddling. They also must get the horse to the paddock on time.
Trainers generally are required to make certain that they use li-
censed help and that the horse's owner is licensed. If a trainer is
going to be absent from the track a replacement trainer, licensed
and approved by the stewards, must be found to take over the
duties.
The trainers are not only the general superintendents in the
barn area; they also are public relations officers. When owners
come to watch their horses race, trainers are the ones who ac-
company them. Being with the owner requires clean clothes and
a presentable appearance. Most trainers, therefore, will clean up
and change clothes after morning workouts. Thoughtful, consci-
entious trainers will make certain that their horses are not left
alone during the interim.
III. How DOES A CASE GET TO THE RACING COMMISSION?
Each of the thirty states with pari-mutuel wagering on horse
21 A condition book is published by the race track and describes the type of races that
the track plans to offer during the next two weeks. The harness tracks publish a condition
sheet, or overnight, which lists proposed races for the next few days.
In the harness industry, or where thoroughbred racing is at night, the morning ac-
tivities are similar to those described in the text although they tend to start at a later hour.
' Entries for afternoon races are usually made in the morning. Where racing is at
night, entries are usually made in the early evening. Most thoroughbred entries are taken
48 hours before a race, while most harness entries are made 72 hours before a race.
23 E.g., 810 Ky. AMMIN. REGS. 1:008 (1982).
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racing has established a state racing commission to regulate rac-
ing. Each commission promulgates its own racing rules and pro-
cedures as prescribed by the state's racing statute and adminis-
trative procedure act. There are, however, many similar rules
among the thirty racing states.
The regulatory authority of the various racing commissions
extends to every facet of racing and includes setting standards for
licensing, testing equine urine and blood samples and protecting
the public from cheating. Each commission is empowered to im-
pose a civil penalty against a licensee of that state for violation of
the racing law and rules. The penalty imposed by one commis-
sion is, in almost all instances, honored by all other racing states.
The typical drugging case comes to the attention of the rac-
ing commission in the form of the laboratory report. The report
will disclose the presence of a prohibited drug in the sample but
precious little else. In the normal case, the testing laboratory can-
not determine how a drug was administered (whether by intra-
venous, subcutaneous, or intra-muscular injection, oral adminis-
tration, topical administration or rectal infusion), when a drug
was administered or how much drug was administered. The
more unusual or exotic the drug, the more difficult it is to find.24
Evidence regarding the pharmacological effects of illicit
drugs is equally difficult for racing commissions to acquire. Most
commissions do not have a specialist in equine pharmacology on
24 Lewis E. Harris, President of the Association of Official Racing Chemists, has
said:
There is a continuous flow of new human or animal drugs being intro-
duced in the United States, Canada, and other countries .... For exam-
ple, during 1981, there were 27 new drug entities approved by the Food and
Drug Administration for marketing in the United States .... To this list
can be added those new drug products which were introduced in other parts
of the world.
Another problem which confronts the racing chemist is the use of drug
compounds which are in the research and development stage and are not yet
marketed .... A few years ago, the drug Pemoline was detected in urine
from horses at one of the tracks. This drug was not marketed; however, in-
vestigations suggested that one or more persons from a research laboratory
were providing the experimental drug to certain individuals for use in racing
animals. In a more recent case the drug Clembuterol was involved. The
drug is not marketed in the United States but was being supplied to veter-
inarians for clinical investigation.
Speech by Lewis E. Harris, reprinted in 48 NASRC BULL. 17:111 (Apr. 29,1982).
11091981-82]
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their staffs. The veterinary literature contains very little on the
effects of illegal substances upon race horses.
Although procedures vary from state to state, the laboratory
report is normally transmitted by the laboratory to the stew-
ards.P Often, the stewards will order a searchl of the trainer's
barn area before the trainer is notified of the laboratory report. If
hypodermic needles, syringes or drugs are found during the
search, the trainer may face a disciplinary proceeding involving
both drugging and possession charges as well as criminal pro-
ceedings.X Drugs found in a search of the trainer's stable area
provide some evidence of the trainer's knowledge of the drug-
ging, particularly if the drugs are similar to those contained in
the post-race sample.P
Once notified of the positive 29 laboratory report, the trainer
is summoned to appear before the stewardso In almost every
state, the legislative scheme or the commission regulations recog-
25 Stewards generally have supervisory power with respect to racing matters over
track management, racing commission employees, and all licensees at each track. Like
referees and umpires in other sports, they determine when fouls occur in the contest (the
race). As importantly, they also enforce the racing commission rules. In most states, stew-
ards have the power by statute or rule to impose civil penalties and to suspend licenses.
2 See Wilkey v. Illinois Racing Bd., 423 U.S. 802 (1975) (mem.) (judgement of
three-judge federal court upholding the constitutionality of warrantless administrative
searches on race tracks was affirmed).
27 See State v. Dolce, 428 A.2d 947 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1981) (warrantless search after a
post-race blood sample contained Butazolidan revealed hypodermic needle, syringe and
Sublimaze, Innovar and Ritalin, controlled substances).
2 Jones v. Superior Ct. of Orange, 170 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1981); Wilkey v. Board of
Business Regulation, Dep't of Business Regulations, 374 So. 2d 17 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975); Fioravanti v. State Racing Comm'n, 375 N.E.2d 722 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978); Im-
prescia v. State Racing Comm'n, 371 N.E.2d 1389 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978).
29 Post-race testing chemistry relied, in its infancy, on crystal tests and color reagent
tests. When drugs were present, the crystals or colors reacted in a "positive" manner. For a
description of various laboratory tests, see Kentucky Racing Comm'n v. Fuller, 481
S.W.2d 298 (Ky. 1972) and Tassistro v. Louisiana State Racing Comm'n, 269 So. 2d at
834. While such tests are rarely used today, the word "positive," meaning a laboratory re-
port indicating the presence of a prohibited drug in a test sample, has become a part of the
industry's vocabulary.
30 While the proceeding before the stewards is generally referred to as a "hearing" or
"inquiry," that proceeding is generally an informal one where stewards investigate, sum-
mon witnesses, and then impose civil penalties. The formality of these initial proceedings
varies from track to track and state to state.
A survey by the authors reveals that none of the stewards in the United States are
lawyers, although a few have practical training in the law.
BRENNAN REVISITED
nize the desirability of informal, prompt determinations. Provi-
sion is made for a de novo hearing if the matter is appealed to the
racing commission .'
Because of the useful work done by the stewards, the ad-
mitted therapeutic and accidental 2 drugging cases rarely reach
the racing commission. Where penalties are severe, the trainer
may ask the racing commission for leniency but admit responsi-
bility for the drugging. Few of these cases are litigated beyond
the trial court level, probably because the costs preclude further
appeals. Since it is difficult to detect drugs that tranquilize, most
of the reported drugging cases involve stimulants and pain
killers, i.e., drugging to win.
IV. GENESIS OF ABSOLUTE INSURER DOCTRINE
The earliest reported- racing case involving the drugging of
a race horse is Carroll v. California Horse Racing Board,1 de-
cided in 1939 by a California District Court of Appeals, wherein
a post-race saliva sample tested positive for an alkaloid resem-
bling the stimulant strychnine. The regular trainer of the horse
was ill at the time of the race. Carroll,3 an employee of the
trainer, was substituting for him on that day. The California
Horse Racing Board (CHRB) ordered, without notice or hearing,
that Carroll's license be suspended.
At the time of the Carroll case, the California rules prohib-
ited the administration of any drug or chemical (other than food
and water) within twenty-four hours of a race. The rules also
provided as follows: "Should the [pre- or post-race saliva] exam-
31 See Baker v. Illinois Racing Bd., 427 N.E.2d 959 (il. Ct. App. 1981); Berry v.
Michigan Racing Comm'n, 321 N.W.2d 880, 885 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
32 Penalties imposed by the stewards in these cases tend to be light or non-existent.
Hacker v. Pennsylvania Horse Racing Comm'n, 405 A.2d 1379 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979),
is an exception to this proposition.
3 While the racing industry waits for answers to many legal questions, some appel-
late courts have assumed that racing cases are not worthy of publication. Fortunately, the
manifest interest of all racing commissions in such opinions has persuaded at least two ap-
pellate courts in recent years to publish opinions originally scheduled as "not for publica-
tion." They are Jacobs v. Kentucky State Racing Comm'n, 562 S.W.2d at 641 and Baker
v. Illinois Racing Bd., 427 N.E.2d at 959.
34 93 P.2d 266 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1939), rev'd, 105 P.2d 110 (Cal. 1940).
-35 Nothing in the record indicated that Carroll administered the strychnine.
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ination prove positive, and the test show the presence of a pro-
hibited drug or chemical, owner and trainer of the horse shall be
ruled off for life."
The principal issue in the case was whether the trainer had a
right to notice and opportunity to be heard prior to the suspen-
sion of his license. In holding that Carroll had no right, the Cali-
fornia District Court of Appeals concluded that the CHRB had
"just cause for its action" because of the drugging. Although the
words "absolute" and "insurer" were not in the CHRB rules, the
appellate court used these words twice in holding that the trainer
had "absolute" final responsibility for the condition of the horse
in the race and became thereby the "insurer" of the condition of
the horse.X The opinion of the California appellate court appears
to be the genesis of what later was incorporated in racing com-
mission rules as the so-called absolute insurer rule.
Carroll appealed to the California Supreme Court which re-
versed and held that the California statute required that the
trainer be given notice and hearing.3 The Supreme Court, how-
ever, did not discuss the issue of the trainer's responsibility for the
condition of his horse.
V. IRREBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION RULE
Maryland became the next testing ground for a commission's
drugging rule. In Mahoney v. Byers,39 the Maryland Racing
Commission suspended the license of a trainer when a post-race
analysis revealed benzedrine, a stimulant, in the saliva of a horse
trained by him. The Maryland rule provided that if the Commis-
sion found that a drug was administered within forty-eight hours
prior to a race,
the trainer shall be subject to the penalties [provided in the
rules], whether or not he administered the drug, or knowingly
or carelessly permitted it to be administered. The fact that the
analysis shows the presence of a drug shall be conclusive evi-
3693 P.2d at 269. The term "ruled off' means not only that a license is suspended or
revoked, but also that the licensee is barred from being physically present on a race track.
37 Id. at 274.
38 105 P.2d at 110.
39 48 A.2d 600 (Md. 1946).
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dence either that there was knowledge of the fact on the part of
the trainer or that he was guilty of carelessness in permitting it
to be administered.
40
Despite protests by the racing Commission that the rule created
merely a prima facie presumption of liability, the Maryland
Court of Appeals held that the rule was unconstitutional because
it created an irrebuttable presumption which "destroyed the
right of [the trainer] to offer evidence to establish his inno-
cence."41
The Maryland Racing Commission also attempted to justify
the suspension by arguing that Byers' carelessness had permitted
the horse to be drugged because the horse was not kept under
guard before the race. The court refused to accept that argument
because the Commission then had no rule requiring horses to be
guarded.42
40 Id. at 602.
41 Id. at 603.
42 There was evidence in Byers that some trainers kept guard over their horses and
others did not. From this evidence the court concluded that the racing Commission must
have been aware of the situation and condoned it by failing to adopt a rule which required
guarding.
The Maryland court's attitude in Byers was apparently influenced by the facts ad-
duced in another racing case, Brann v. Mahoney, 48 A.2d 605 (Md. 1946), decided the
same day, in which the court focused on the nature of the proceedings before the Mary-
land Racing Commission. The trainers in Brann alleged that the Commission gave them
short notice of a hearing and refused to specify charges. The Commission did not disclose
until the hearing started that the drug involved was morphine, a stimulant. Information
about the case was obtained by the newspapers and radio before it was received by those
charged. The Commission chair was alleged to have stated to a reporter for a world-wide
news service that the five trainers "would be suspended for one year 'regardless of addi-
tional facts yet to be revealed at the hearings."' Id. at 608. The constitutionality of the
drugging rule was not considered in Brann.
In Byers, the court justified its conclusion that the Maryland rule was not a prima
facie presumption by stating, "It is sufficient to say that the comments of the Chairman of
the Commission, made during the course of the hearing before it, and its final order, show
that the irrebuttable presumption set up in the rule was applied to this case." 48 A.2d at
604.
While Byers and Brann were pending in Maryland, a drugging case was litigated
In New York. Both the Appellate Division and the New York Court of Appeals merely
found that "while the trainer was not present when the medicine was applied, there was
evidence from which responsibility for the treatment could be found to have been estab-
lished." Smith v. Cole, 62 N.Y.S.2d 226 (App. Div.), appeal granted, 68 N.E.2d 888
(N.Y. 1946).
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VI. INSURER RULE HELD IN EFFECT IRREBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION
In State ex rel. Paoli v. Baldwin,43 the Florida Supreme
Court, by a vote of four to three upon rehearing in 1947,44 held
that the state's absolute insurer rule violated the due process
clause of both the Florida and federal Constitutions. Unlike the
Maryland rule in Byers, the Florida rule did not refer to the mat-
ter of presumption.4 5 Nevertheless, the Florida court, which was
"influenced decisively" by the opinion in the Byers case, held
that the Florida rule "in effect" made proof of a positive urine
sample irrebuttable evidence that the trainer had administered
the prohibited drug regardless of the acts of third parties. 46 The
horse's groom, who had been employed by Paoli for only a few
weeks before the fixed race, placed bets on the drugged horse,
cashed his winning tickets immediately after the race and left
Paoli's employment without notice after Paoli was suspended be-
cause of the benzedrine in the urine sample.
VII. STRICT LIABILITY WITHOUT FAULT
Although absolute liability had been imposed in tort cases
and under public welfare regulations for many decades, 47 the
43 31 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 1947), overruled, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering v. Caple,
362 So. 2d 1350 (Fla. 1978).
44 The Florida Supreme Court, by a vote of four to two, initially upheld the constitu-
tionality of the insurer rule in Florida. Upon rehearing, the court reversed its earlier vote
after a new justice came to the court and another justice changed his position.
45 Similar to the pristine version of the absolute insurer rule, the text of the rule may
be found at 31 So. 2d at 630.
46 The Florida court in Paoli did not consider whether the state under its police
power could constitutionally enforce strict liability upon the trainer for the condition of
the horse. Note, however, that Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering v. Caple, 362 So. 2d at
1350, overruled Paoli, holding that strict liability under the absolute insurer rule is "both
reasonable and constitutional." Id. at 1355.
47 The law of torts began with a legal obligation imposed without fault and evolved
into liability based upon culpability or negligence. For a historical review, see W. Pnos-
SER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 641-44, 657-58 (4th ed. 1971). However, the orig-
inal concept of liability without fault was continued for abnormally dangerous activities,
such as blasting, and handling explosives or other dangerous substances. See the early Eng-
lish cases of May v. Burdett, 9 Q.B. 101, 115 Eng. Rep. 1213, 3 ERC 108 (1846) (absolute
liability upon keeper of wild animals); Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 H.L. 330 (1860) (absolute li-
ability for water collected in quantity in dangerous places); and RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS, §§ 508,519-20 (1965).
BRENNAN REVISITED
first case upholding a state's power to impose strict liability upon
a trainer without proof of fault was Sandstrom v. California
Horse Racing Board,4S where a post-race urine sample disclosed
the presence of a caffeine-type alkaloid. In this landmark racing
law case, the Supreme Court of California in 1948 interpreted
that state's absolute insurer rule as a reasonable imposition of li-
ability on a trainer. Treating the rule as creating strict liability
without proof of fault, the court held that the trainer would be
found liable upon proof that he was the trainer and that the
horse was drugged.
The majority in Sandstrom noted that the state, in the exer-
cise of its police power, had undertaken to regulate wagering on
horse racing. It further noted that the California rule had been
promulgated by the CHRB in the exercise of its regulatory au-
thority over racing and was therefore subject to judicial review
only to the extent of determining whether such rule was reason-
able. The test of reasonableness, according to the majority opin-
ion, "depends on the character or nature of the condition to be
met or overcome." 49 The court, in applying the reasonableness
test to the absolute insurer rule in question, concluded: "The
closer the supervision to which the trainer is held, the more diffi-
cult it becomes for anyone to administer a drug or chemical to
the horse. The exaction of the ultimate in that regard is justified
by the peril to be avoided."5° The Court held that the rule did not
contain an irrebuttable presumption but warned that strict li-
ability without fault may not be imposed "by inference, or indis-
criminately, or upon persons having but a minor part in an activ-
ity. "5,
In a short dissent, Justice Edmonds stated that a trainer
could take every precaution but still be held liable under the rule
During recent years, the concept of strict liability in tort has been extended, with-
out proof of negligence or privity of contract, to manufacturers of products whose defec-
tive condition makes them unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer. See, e.g.,
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963); Suvada v. White
Motor Co., 210 N.E.2d 182, 186-88 (Ml. 1965); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF ToRTs § 402A
(1965).
48 189 P.2d 16 (Cal.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 814 (1948).
49 189 P.2d at2l.
5 0
Id.
51 Id. at 22.
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for the acts of others over whom he had no control.52 Justice
Schauer, in a concurring opinion that responds to the dissent,
suggested that a trainer could protect himself from strict liability
under the rule simply "by protecting the horse and by checking
its condition at the last reasonable possible moment before the
race."-
In his lengthier dissent, Justice Carter accused the majority
of "specious reasoning" and remarked that the rule "may appro-
priately be labeled as 'un-American."' He further stated, "Cer-
tainly, there can be no difference in legal effect between absolute
liability and a conclusive presumption."54
Justice Carter twice raised the spectre of a possible vigilant
trainer whose horse is drugged by "stealthy culprits" without the
trainer's knowledge. He noted that, contrary to Justice Schauer's
view, trainers under such circumstances could not protect them-
selves from liability by scratching the horse because they would
have no knowledge of the tampering by the stealthy culprits.5
Drawing upon his own experience in the training of non-racing
horses, Justice Carter took judicial notice that "a trainer does not
sleep with his horse, nor is with him during all his waking
hours."56
The principle and rule announced in Sandstrom were
followed and applied by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia in State ex rel. Morris v. West Virginia Racing Commis-
sion, where an owner-trainer was suspended upon discovery of
drugsm in the urine sample. The West Virginia rule did not con-
tain absolute insurer language but did provide that "the trainer
shall be held responsible for the condition of his horse." 9
52 Id. at 25 (Edmonds, J., dissenting).
5 Id. at 24 (Schauer, J., concurring).
54 Id. at 26, 27 (Carter, J., dissenting).
5 Id. at 29, 31. Sandstrom was followed that same year by the California Appellate
Court decision in Taylor v. Wright, 191 P.2d 73 (Cal. Dist. App. Ct. 1948).
56 Id. at 29. Justice Carter ignores the vital distinction between what really happens
in racing and what racing commissions have a right to expect will happen.
57 55 S.E.2d 263 (W. Va. 1949).
5 The sample contained "Atropine, Hyoscyamine or Hyoscine and possibly some
other drug." Id. at 269.
59 Id. at 264.
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The West Virginia court, in testing the reasonableness of that
state's trainer responsibility rule, stated:
[Wie think it imperative that, in the conduct of racing in this
State . . . there should and does exist the power to make rules
which will effectually guard against fraud and deception in
racing, which may be effected through administering drugs or
narcotics, or by any other means. . . Every consideration sur-
rounding the business of operating a race track, and the racing
of horses thereon, seems to us to call for firm and rigid rules
placing responsibility and imposing penalties for their viola-
tion. Conceding that the rule.., is harsh and may, in some
instances, result in injustice to innocent people, we think the
rule can be justified on the grounds of public policy, because it
is the only effective means by which fraud and deceit in con-
nection with horse racing can be minimized.60
The trainer's defense in the Morris case was somewhat novel.
She maintained that the racing Commission, rather than the
trainer, was responsible for protecting the horses from drugging.
She alleged that the Commission had failed to furnish twenty-
four-hour police protection as required by its own rules and that,
as a result, there was no way to prevent the public from going to
the barns and tampering with the horses.
In fixing responsibility upon the trainer, rather than the
commission or track,6' for the condition of the horse, the West
Virginia court stated:
[T]he power to assure fairness in racing must rest somewhere,
and responsibility therefor must be definitely fixed, if any
practical results are to be expected ... No one, we assume,
will contend that the drugging of race horses ... is not an evil
which must be scotched wherever present, and by any reason-
able and adaptable method. Making the owner-trainer or the
trainer responsible ... is one way, and perhaps the best way,
60 Id. at 274-75.
61 See Ohio Thoroughbred Racing Ass'n v. Ohio State Racing Comm'n, 180 N.E.2d
276 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961) (held absolute insurer rule was unlawful and unreasonable as
applied to race track operators). Racing commissions have insisted that race track oper-
ators participate in efforts to prevent druggings. However, the track operators alone can




of assuring the racing authorities, and the track patrons, thatthe race will be fair. 62
There were three dissenters in Morris, including Justice
Hammond, who wrote the unanimous opinion two years later in
Spiker v. West Virginia Racing Commission,3 reaffirming the
earlier decision in Morris. In Spiker, the horse Lucky Linda,
drugged with procaine, was suspended and the purse won by her
was redistributed. 64
The Ohio absolute insurer rule was upheld in Fogt v. Ohio
State Racing Commission,6 six years66 after a harness horse raced
with "Duracillin," a drug containing penicillin and procaine, in
its system. Fogt admitted that he administered the drug but de-
nied that he violated the rule intentionally.
In regard to guilty knowledge or intent, the Ohio Court of
Appeals said:
Horse racing, at its best, is difficult to control, and would be
practically impossible to regulate if every governing rule and
regulation was made dependent for validity upon the knowl-
edge or motives of the person charged with a violation.
Guilty knowledge or intent are not necessarily indispensable to
the validity of a regulation designed for the protection and
general welfare of the public.
62 55S.E.2dat271.
6363 S.E.2d 831 (W. Va. 1951).
4 The constitutionality of the purse redistribution rule, which is common to all rac-
ing jurisdictions, was sustained in Edelberg v. Illinois Racing Bd., 540 F.2d 279 (7th Cir.
1976). South Dakota is perhaps the only racing state that still requires suspension of a
horse. Its rule has not been judicially challenged.
Ignetio, the two-year-old thoroughbred champion of Puerto Rico in 1970, was
suspended from racing after post-race tests revealed the horse had been doped. The
owner, who was adjudged innocent, alleged that his property had been confiscated in vi-
olation of federal due process. In Suarez v. Administrator Del Deporte Hipico de Puerto
Rico, 354 F. Supp. 320 (D.P.R., 1972), the court denied the administrator's motion to dis-
miss and convened a three-judge court to consider the constitutional issue.
6 210 N.E.2d 730 (Ohio Ct. App. 1965).
6 Joshua Bigg, chief investigator of the law firm of Tabatchnick, Orsini, Reilly &
Teitelbaum, said: "I came to realize that there are two kinds of time. One has sixty min-
utes to an hour, twenty-four hours to a day, moving along at a fast clip. And then there is
legal time, oozing so sluggishly that movement can scarcely be noted." L. SANDERS, THE
TENmT COMMANDMENT 15 (1980). See, e.g., Briley v. Louisiana State Racing Comm'n,
410 So. 2d 802 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (more than eight years elapsed between the Commis-
sion's decision and the appellate court decision).
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Manifestly, it would be almost impossible to prove guilty
knowledge or intent in cases of this kind, and the futility of
prosecutions under a rule requiring probative evidence of
guilty knowledge and intent would eventually leave the public
interest and welfare to the mercy of the unscrupulous.7
Although the Ohio appellate court cited no precedents on trainer
responsibility, the above language has been frequently quoted,
perhaps because it so aptly answers a trainer's claimed lack of
mens rea.
VIII. FAILURE TO GUARD
As California changed its drugging rule between Carroll and
Sandstrom, so did the Maryland Racing Commission after Byers.
By 1957, when Maryland Racing Commission v. McGee8
reached Maryland's highest court, the conclusive presumption
language had been deleted from the Maryland racing rules. Hav-
ing learned from its defeat in the Byers case, the Commission de-
lineated in its rulesm the high standard of care which the Com-
mission expected of trainers, i.e., do whatever is necessary to pre-
vent horses from being drugged.
McGee is the first reported case that involved the suspension
of a trainer for failure to guard a horse to prevent drugging.
McGee employed a seventy-nine-year-old night watchman who
was on duty from 6:00 p.m. until McGee's foreman arrived at
67 210 N.E.2d at 733. Contra Battles v. Ohio State Racing Comm'n, 230 N.E.2d 662
(Ohio Ct. App. 1967) (held that scienter must be proved, even under an absolute insurer
rule, where the drug does not affect the horse's racing ability). This distinction, not readily
apparent from the language of the rule, is no longer valid in Ohio after the decision in
O'Daniel v. Ohio State Racing Comm'n, 307 N.E.2d at 529 (upholding absolute insurer
rule).
68 128A.2d at 419.
69 The revised Maryland rule stated:
No person shall administer, or cause or knowingly permit to be admin-
istered, or connive at the administration of, any drug to any horse entered
for a race.
Every owner, trainer, or groom must guard, or cause to be guarded,
each horse owned, trained or attended by him in such manner as to prevent
any person or persons from administering to the horse, by any method any
drug prior to the time of the start of the race which is of such character to af-




5:00 a.m. Since the horses were stabled in three separate barns,
the drugged horse Morning After had been left unguarded for at
least twenty minutes while the watchman fed the other horses.70
Like Paoli before and Brennan after, McGee suggested that a
former employee had drugged Morning After.71 McGee had a
dispute over pay with the employee, who "threatened to make
trouble for McGee and to get his money one way or the other."72
Several days before the race, McGee learned that the disgruntled
former employee was working on the other side of the barn
where Morning After was stabled. Unlike the Paoli and Brennan
courts, the McGee court was not persuaded by this argument.
The post-race urine sample disclosed the presence of caf-
feine, a stimulant, in Morning After. The trainer maintained
the caffeine came from coffee or coca-cola spilled on Morning
After's straw or in his drinking water after the race. Morning
After's owner, however, described either possibility as "an out-
side one, 'a thousand to one shot."'7 The court held that the
"Commission was not required to accept such odds." 74
McGee contended that Maryland's failure-to-guard rule was
the equivalent of the former rule creating an irrebuttable pre-
sumption and that so construed would be unconstitutional under
the Byers case. The court rejected this argument and upheld the
rule as reasonable.
IX. RIGHT-PRIVILEGE DISTINCTION
Ten days before the decision in the Brennan case was an-
70 McGee had 20 horses in training .at Laurel Race Course. He vanned them to
Bowie for racing. Although most of the horses were in one barn, there were some in two
other barns. One of the night watchman's duties was to feed all the horses at 3:30 a.m.
71 McGee also argued that the only way the horse could have been drugged was by
someone taking advantage of the opportunity afforded by the absence of lights in the barn.
He testified that the watchman could not have been expected to stand at the door of the
horse's stable in 25° weather. The court found that McGee "acknowledged that the
seventy-nine year old watchman, whose physical condition and faculties are not disclosed
by the record but could be evaluated by the Commission, could not properly guard the
horse, MORNING AFTER, even while he was on the premises because of weather condi-
tions and inadequate lighting at the barn." Id. at 425.
72 Id. at 422.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 425. McGee's arguments about spilled coffee or Coca-Cola are standard de-
fense claims in cases involving caffeine positives.
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nounced, the New Mexico Supreme Court, in Sanderson v. New
Mexico Racing Commission,75 upheld the constitutionality of
both a rule imposing strict liability as a condition for an owner-
trainer's license and a rule requiring the person in charge of the
horse to guard against the administration of drugs. In upholding
the rules, the court held that they neither created a presumption
nor deprived the trainer of any constitutional right.
The Sanderson case is particularly significant because of the
New Mexico Supreme Court's strong reliance upon the right-
privilege distinction. The court characterized the trainer's license
as a privilege rather than a property right protected by the due
process clause of the state and federal constitutions. However,
there is a division of authority on this issue.76
X. BRENNAN VIEW OF ABSOLUTE INSURER RULE
In 1969, the Supreme Court of Illinois, by a four to three
vote, in Brennan v. Illinois Racing Board,77 invalidated Illinois'
absolute insurer rule.7s The majority in Brennan relied upon the
75 453 P.2d 370 (N.M. 1969). The urine sample contained procaine which had come
from the use of a topical ointment on the horse.
76 Robert S. Hammer states that a trainer has a property interest in a license only if
the regulatory scheme creates such an interest. Hammer, Licensee Discipline and Due
Process, 12 CoNN. L. REv. 870, 875 (1979-80). Under his analysis, a regulatory-licensing
scheme may be devised that does not create property interests, thereby allowing license
terminations without rigorous due process requirements. Id. Hammer also suggests that
the outdated right-privilege distinction was given new life by Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55
(1979), which upheld a summary suspension of a trainer's license pending full administra-
tive hearing where a post-race urine sample contained Lasix. Hammer, supra at 872 n.ll.
Hammer served as counsel in the Barchi case. His view is shared by Kent Hollingsworth,
distinguished editor of THE BLOOD-HoRsE. Hollingsworth, U.S. Supreme Court Rules on
Racing Administrative Procedure, 1979 THE BLOOD-HORSE 3308. But see Phillips v.
Graham, 427 N.E.2d 550, 555 (Ill. 1981) ("There is no question that the license of the
plaintiffs to pursue an occupation, as a trainer, owner and driver of harness horses, is a
property interest given protection by the due process clause").
77 247N.E.2d at 881.
78 The rule read as follows:
The trainer shall be the absolute insurer of and be responsible for the condi-
tion of horses entered by him in a race regardless of the acts of a third party.
Should chemical or other analysis of saliva or urine samples, or other tests,
show the presence of any drug of any kind or description, the Board may in
its discretion suspend or revoke the license of the trainer, the stable foreman
in charge of the horse, the groom, and any other person shown to have had
the care or attendance of the horse.
Id. at 882.
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Paoli and Byers cases but made no attempt to reconcile those
cases with the contrary line of authorities in other jurisdictions.79
The Paoli decision has since been overruled and Maryland's high-
est court has distinguished its Byers decision* upon the ground
that the rule there involved an irrebuttable presumption.8' The
precedents upon which the majority in Brennan based its opin-
ion, therefore, have been cut from under it, leaving the opinion
without precedential foundation.
The post-race urine sample of Brennan's horse contained
ritalin, a psychic stimulant. Trainer Brennan placed the blame
upon a former employee, whom he had fired but who had been
seen around the premises before the race. There was no proof
that the trainer knew of the doping of his horse or participated in
it.
The issue was whether the absolute insurer measure could be
upheld as a legitimate exercise of the state's police power. The
majority applied the following two-pronged test: (1) whether the
means employed under the police power bear a real and substan-
tial relation to the public welfare, and (2) whether the means
employed are essentially reasonable. Under the majority's anal-
ysis, the absolute insurer measure failed both tests and was held
to be arbitrary, unreasonable and a deprivation of due process.
In regard to the public welfare, Justice Klingbiel, speaking
for the majority, stated:
It would seem that the only applications of the rule which
would not be equally covered by one based on fault would be
to situations which the trainer could not have prevented any-
way. We see little if any tendency in penalty-without-fault
provisions to reduce the frequency of the crime.82
The majority found the absolute insurer rule unreasonable
because a trainer could be penalized without fault for someone
else's crime. Justice Klingbiel concluded that a drugging rule
79 E.g., Sandstrom v. California Horse Racing Bd., 189 P.2d at 16; Fogt v. Ohio
State Racing Comm'n, 210 N.E.2d at 730; State ex rel. Morris v. West Virginia Racing
Comm'n, 55 S.E.2d at 263. For a discussion of the cited cases upholding the absolute in-
surer rule, see notes 48-67 supra and accompanying text.
80 Division of Pari-Mutuel Wageringv. Caple, 362 So. 2d at 1350.
81 Maryland Racing Comm'n v. McGee, 128 A.2d at 423-33.
82 247 N.E.2d at 884.
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based upon "traditional principles of culpability" and the "exer-
cise of due care" would be more appropriate than a rule of abso-
lute liability or a rule of strict liability without fault Ps
Writing for the minority, Justice Schaefer maintained that
the majority had usurped the authority of the legislature in the
exercise of its police power.8 He cited the Sandstrom, Morris and
Fogt cases, all of which sustained rules similar to that invalidated
in Brennan. In support of the rule, Justice Schaefer also cited
United States v. Dotterweich85 and United States v. Balint,86
wherein federal criminal statutes were interpreted to create strict
liability without proof of intent.
Justice Schaefer recognized that the betting public cannot
protect itself against drugging, as the winning bets are paid off
immediately after the race. Under these circumstances, the mi-
nority believed that the legislature was justified "in imposing
upon the trainer the duty to take whatever steps are necessary" to
insure that his horse is free of drugs.87
The Brennan case addressed the classic conflict in all prior
drugging cases between absolute liability or strict liability and li-
ability based upon fault. For many years after the decision was
8 Id. Justice Klingbiel explained:
Under a rule based on traditional principles of culpability the circumstances
prevailing in the horse racing business may be such as to require a showing
of close supervision on the part of a trainer before he can be found to have
been free of negligence. Indeed, there is virtually nothing a trainer is in a po-
sition to do that could not be required in a particular case, as having been
necessary in the exercise of due care of the horse.
Id.
84 Id. at 885 (Schaefer, J., dissenting). At this point, it is perhaps appropriate, if not
lacking in temerity, to suggest the horse racing qua professional wrestling theory. That
theory notes that professional wrestling matches are supposed to be fixed. With fixing as
the basic premise, the theory presumes that courts are unwilling to deal seriously with the
"fixers." Moreover, a survey in 1974 by the Commission on the Review of the National
Policy Toward Gambling revealed that non-bettors, legal bettors and illegal bettors alike
perceived horse-race fixing as something that occurs between "sometimes' and "pretty
often." There is no explicit judicial recognition of the racing qua wrestling theory; but the
theory, coupled with the public's perception of racing, may explain why judicial attitudes
toward racing vary from state to state. Compare, e.g., Kentucky State Racing Comm'n v.
Fuller, 481 S.W.2d at 308-09 (court defers to agency findings of fact) with Wilkey v. Illi-
nois Racing Bd., 381 N.E.2d at 1387-88 (court reviews agency findings of fact).
85 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
s6 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
87 247 N.E.2d at 885 (Schaefer, J., dissenting).
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announced, the majority's apparent lack of concern about the
commission's ability to regulate racing overshadowed all else
about the opinion. This gloomy perception by some commis-
sioners and staffas forestalled immediate recognition of the court's
guideposts for effective regulation-a rule requiring trainers to
exercise due care for the horse.
XI. POST-BRENNAN DECISIONS AND RULES
The Brennan decision reflected a distinct minority view
when issued. All state supreme courts 9 and all state appellate
gourts 0 which have passed upon the constitutionality of absolute
insurer or strict liability rules during the post-Brennan era have
upheld the validity of such rule. This trend of decisions clearly
88 See id. at 884. ("The Board claims it would be practically impossible to regulate
horse racing 'if every rule and regulation was dependent upon knowledge or motives of a
person charged with a violation.' But even if we assume the statement to be an accurate
one, it is no answer to the plaintiff's arguments. Administrative convenience is not a con-
stitutional substitute for the rights of individuals") (emphasis added).
As late as the mid-1970s, members of the Illinois Racing Board were considering
resurrection of the absolute insurer rule in Illinois.
89 See Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering v. Caple, 362 So. 2d at 1350; Jamison v.
State Racing Comm'n, 507 P.2d at 426; O'Daniel v. Ohio State Racing Comm'n, 307
N.E.2d at 529. See also Hodges v. Alberta Racing Comm'n, No. 14068 (Alberta, Can. Ct.
of App. Dec. 9, 1982); Schvaneveldt v. Idaho State Horse Racing Comm'n, 578 P.2d 673,
676 (Idaho 1978).
90 See, e.g., McFarlin v. Department of Business Regulations, 405 So. 2d 255 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1981), appeal dismissed, 411 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 1981) (rule upheld against ar-
gument that it unconstitutionally delegated legislative power); Solimena v. State, 402 So.
2d at 1240 (suspension of three trainers for Sublimaze positives under absolute insurer rule
upheld against challenge that rule invalidly delegated legislative power); Briley v. Louis-
iana State Racing Comm'n, 410 So. 2d at 802 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (involved amphet-
amines; absolute insurer rule upheld against due process and equal protection challenges);
Fiorvanti v. State Racing Comm'n, 375 N.E.2d at 722 (upheld absolute insurer rule as ra-
tional exercise of police power and sustained trainer suspension where horse drugged with
apomorphine). See also Imprescia v. State Racing Comm'n, 371 N.E.2d at 1369 (amphet-
amines positives); Berry v. Michigan Racing Comm'n, 321 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. Ct. App.
1982) (absolute insurer rule upheld as proper exercise of police power advancing a valid
public purpose and providing a remedy reasonably related to that public purpose). The
Berry court, in affirming the two year suspension of a trainer for two apomorphine pos-
itives, held the absolute insurer rule "simply does not concern itself with assigning fault,
but instead requires the trainer, as a contingency of being licensed by the state, to bear the
responsibility for the horses' condition." Id. at 882.
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demonstrates "a perceived change in the jurisprudence through-
out the country in this area of strict liability." 9'
Several racing commissions, however, have adopted rules
imposing liability upon trainers based upon traditional principles
of culpability and the exercise of due care for the horses. 92 These
provisions in general require trainers to protect and guard their
horses against the administration of any drug before they can be
found free of negligence. Under these rules, proof of the presence
of a drug in a post-race sample is considered prima facie evidence
that a trainer has been negligent in the handling of the horse.
The rules based upon culpability and due care have been chal-
lenged in various courts during the post-Brennan era but always
upheld.93
91 Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering v. Caple, 362 So. 2d at 1352.
92 E.g., 11 ILL. ADMIN. REG. 509.20. After Brennan, the Illinois Racing Board
adopted a trainer responsibility rule requiring trainers to guard their horses against drug-
ging and creating a rebuttable presumption that the trainer is negligent in guarding where
laboratory test shows that the horse was drugged. Ironically, Jean Brennan, the trainer in
the celebrated Brennan case, was suspended and penalized in 1979 under the new rule, the
first suspension in Illinois for a Sublimaze positive. The suspension was upheld by the
Circuit Court of Cook County in Holthus & Brennan v. Illinois Racing Bd., 79 CCH 504
(April 17, 1979).
93 See Barchi v. Sarafan, 436 F. Supp. 775 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), afJ'd in part, rev'd in
part sub noma. Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55 (1979) (trainer's summary suspension upheld
where proof of Lasix in sample established rebuttable presumption that trainer had been
negligent regarding horse's care); Harbour v. Colorado State Racing Comm'n, 505 P.2d
22 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973) (suspension based upon apomorphine positive upheld where
there was no evidence indicating trainer was without fault); Tassitro v. Louisiana State
Racing Comm'n, 269 So. 2d at 834 (suspension based upon phenylbutazone upheld where
trainer had only a dog to guard horse the night before the race, horse left unattended from
5:30 to 6:00 a.m. on day of race, and trainer failed to emphasize security in his instruc-
tions to employees); Dare v. State, 388 A.2d 984 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1978) (suspension
based upon phenylbutazone positive upheld against due process claims where trainer had
attempted to protect the horse by hiring a groom); Hacker v. Pennsylvania Horse Racing
Comm'n, 405 A.2d 1379 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979) (fine upheld where horse ingested
phenylbutazone, an analygesic, from hay in the stall); Johnson v. Commonwealth State
Horse Racing Comm'n, 290 A.2d 277 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1972) (suspension upheld where
trainer admitted administering phenybutazone in West Virginia before trainer learned
horse was entered to race in Pennsylvania); Conway v. State Horse Racing Comm'n, 276
A.2d 840 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1971) (trainer's assertion of care held insufficient to prevent
administration of indomethacin where eight other horses committed to his charge were
given same drug); Commonwealth v. Webb, 274 A.2d 261 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1971), ap-
peal dismissed, 284 A.2d 499 (Pa. 1971) (guarding rule sustained against due process and
equal protection challenges where trainer suspended on phenylbutazone positive). See also
Cooney v. American Horse Shows Ass'n, 495 F. Supp. 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (private asso-
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In Barchi v. Sarafan,94 New York's trainer responsibility rules
were upheld on their face by the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York. These rules not only require
trainers to guard their horses against the administration of drugs,
but also create a rebuttable presumption that a trainer is negli-
gent where drugs are detected in the trainer's horse. In Barchi, a
post-race urinalysis revealed the drug Lasix95 in Be Alert, a har-
ness horse trained by John Barchi at Monticello Raceway.
Barchi's license was suspended for fifteen days without a pre-sus-
pension hearing.
The trainer brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. sec-
tion 1983 in which he challenged the summary exclusion proce-
dure. He also claimed that New York's rules created an imper-
missible presumption of the trainer's guilt in cases where drugs
are detected in a horse's system.
The three-judge federal district court upheld the constitu-
tionality of the New York trainer responsibility rules and found
that:
The ... duty of a trainer to oversee his horses is sufficiently
connected to the occurrence of tampering to support the pre-
sumption established by the trainer's "insurer" rules. The
state's definition of trainer responsibility is reasonably related
to the interests involved and, given the rebuttable nature of
the ... presumption, the high standard of accountability is
not unconstitutional . 9
6
However, the panel held the summary suspension unconstitu-
tional as violative of the trainer's right to due process.
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed the
three-judge court by a five to four vote and upheld the summary
suspension of Barchi's license pending a full administrative hear-
ing.97 Barchi did not cross appeal the district court's ruling that
ciation's trainer responsibility rule upheld). But see Taylor v. Ontario Comm'n, 1 Ont.
400 (Ont. Ct. App. 1970) (suspension and fine reversed because of insufficient notice to
trainer of charges and no evidence of failure to guard where horse's veterinarian adminis-
tered the drug).
94 436 F. Supp. at 783-84.
95 Lasix, the trade name for furosemide, is a powerful diuretic. It may also mask the
presence of other drugs.
96 436 F. Supp. at 784.
97 Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. at 55.
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the New York trainer responsibility rules were constitutional.
Nevertheless, Mr. Justice White, in speaking for the majority, in-
dicated the Court's approval of the presumption:
As for Barchi's culpability, the New York trainer's respon-
sibility rules, approved by the District Court, established a re-
buttable presumption or inference, predicated on the fact of
drugging, that Barchi was at least negligent. In light of the
duties placed upon the trainer by the trainer's responsibility
rules, we accept this inference of culpability as defen-
sible . .. "98
Mr. Justice Brennan, in a dissent with which three justices con-
curred, maintained that the Supreme Court did not have to ad-
dress the issue concerning the trainer's responsibility rules in the
absence of a cross appeal. 9
In Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Webb,'0 the Pennsyl-
vania guard rules were upheld against claims based upon the due
process and equal protection clauses of the state and federal con-
stitutions. The Pennsylvania appellate court declared that the
guard rules are "less oppressive and far less objectionable" than
absolute insurer rules and "provide ample opportunity for an em-
battled trainer to demonstrate his innocence."101
XII. CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS AS AN ENFORCEMENT TOOL
Some contend that an absolute liability rule is not necessary
to protect the racing public from being cheated, especially where
there is a statute which makes it a crime to administer a drug to a
horse entered to race with intent to prearrange the outcome of
the race. 02 This argument is rather hollow, in part because such
key racing states as Arkansas, California, Kentucky, New York
and Ohio do not have statutes that make drugging a criminal vio-
98 Id. at 65.
99 Id. at 69 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
100 274 A.2d at 261.
101 Id. at 266.
102 E.g., Note, Brennan v. Illinois Racing Board: The Validity of Statutes Making a




lation. Since the wave of criminal convictions in the 1930s, there
have been very few, if any, criminal convictions for the adminis-
tration of drugs in those states where such act is criminal.13
7Procedural protections and more stringent burden of proof
requirements make criminal conviction for administering drugs
less likely than the imposition of civil penalties. As indicated in
Fogt, "the futility of prosecutions... would eventually leave
the public interest and welfare to the mercy of the unscrupu-
loUs."104
CONCLUSION
Despite the conflict in the trainer responsibility cases over the
basis and nature of liability, there is general agreement that re-
sponsibility for protecting the horses from drugging must be def-
initely fixed. There also is agreement that this responsibility
should be placed upon trainers,c 5 who have control over their
horses and are in a position to guard and protect them from the
risk of drugging.106 Moreover, trainers will ordinarily have the
most interest in not having their horses barred from the race or
participating in the sport. '07
Effective regulation of racing requires that trainers be en-
couraged to maintain vigilant supervision of their horses and to
institute reliable guarding procedures to safeguard against the
risk of drugging. The placing of this responsibility upon trainers
seems both fair and apt to prevent tampering with a horse. As
Keene Daingerfield, Senior State Steward for the Kentucky Rac-
103 However, there have been a few convictions for related offenses, such as bribery
and conspiracy. See, e.g., People v. Robinson, 24 N.E.2d 375 (Ill. 1939); Commonwealth
v. Nelsofi, 346 N.E.2d 839 (Mass. 1976) (new trials ordered for three persons convicted of
conspiracy to fix race by paying trainers for permission to drug their horses with aceto-
phenazine); State v. Ciulla, 351 A.2d 580 (R.I. 1976) (defendants convicted of conspiracy
to corrupt twelve trainers who accepted bribes from professional "hit" man to drug their
horses with acepromazine); State v. Capone, 347 A.2d 615 (R.I. 1975) (trainer who doped
his horse with acepromazine convicted of unlawfully accepting $200 gratuity from profes-
sional "hit" man).
104 210 N.E.2d at 733.
105 E.g., Morris v. West Virginia Racing Comm'n, 55 S.E.2d at 275; Brennan v. Illi-
nois Racing Bd., 247 N.E.2d at 881.
106 Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering v. Caple, 362 So. 2d at 1356 (rule requiring
drugs be kept in locked storage constitutes reasonable means of eliminating illegal drug-
ging "by placing responsibility on trainer as person most capable of controlling problem").
107 Morris v. West Virginia Racing Comm'n, 55 S.E.2d at 275.
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ing Commission, has observed, "[S]omebody must be responsi-
ble, and by all logic and justice the licensed trainer is the man
under the gun."18
A trainer responsibility rule that imposes either absolute li-
ability or strict liability without proof of fault not only is consis-
tent with long-established legal precedent concerning public
welfare regulation, 109 but also affords the public a maximum of
protection against horse drugging. On the other hand, effective
regulation of racing is not dependent solely upon such a rule.
Racing commissions need and require a full array of powers to li-
cense and discipline licensees guilty of misconduct and to exclude
from racing those whose conduct is detrimental to the sport." 0 A
conscientious racing commission can maintain the integrity of
racing, as many commissions have demonstrated, under a trainer
responsibility rule based upon the. fault and culpability of the
trainer.
The currend trend among the racing states is toward adop-
tion of trainer insurer rules requiring trainers to guard their
horses against drugging and creating a rebuttable presumption
that the trainer whose horse is drugged was negligent in guard-
ing. These rules, based upon-the traditional tort concepts of neg-
ligence and foreseeabiity, comport generally with the guideposts
suggested by the majority in Brennan.
Although the Brennan decision is contrary to legal precedents
and unsound as legal interpretation, many racing commissions
have adopted rules that embrace the recommendation of the ma-
108 Daingerfield, Trainer Qualifications and Duties, THE RACING COMMISSIONER'S
MANUAL 140-44 (1966).
109 E.g., Sandstrom v. California Horse Racing Bd., 189 P.2d at 20; Maryland Rac-
ing Comm'n v. McGee, 128 A.2d at 423-24; State ex rel. Morris v. West Virginia Racing
Comm'n, 55 S.E.2d at 271.
110 A comprehensive security program would also include: a criminal statute making
unauthorized possession of drugs, needles, and syringes on race tracks a criminal violation;
provision for warrantless search of licensed personnel; a computerized data bank main-
tained by NASRC and containing the names of all persons against whom official rulings
have been made; imposition of substantial penalties by the Commission upon proof of
serious violations; and provision preventing any stay of license suspension pending hearing
and formal decision. See Hubel v. West Virginia Racing Comm'n, 513 F.2d 240, 243 (4th
Cir. 1975) (upholds summary suspension of trainer stating: "The combination of strict li-
ability.., and immediate suspension without the possibility of stay, deters tampering
and promotes care").
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jority in Brennan-a requirement that trainers exercise a high
standard of care in guarding their horses. Significantly, the phi-
losophy of the obiter dicta of Brennan but not the legal precedent
has now revisited the racing industry.
